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Benefiting from misfortune:
When harmless actions are judged to be morally blameworthy
Yoel Inbar, David Pizarro, Fiery Cushman
Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, across
four studies we demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless
deemed worthy of blame. Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions
that enable them to benefit from another’s misfortune (for example, betting that a company’s stock will
decline or that a natural disaster will occur). We present evidence suggesting that perceptions of the actor’s
wicked desires are responsible for this phenomenon. We argue that these results are consistent with a growing
literature demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to
evaluations of acts.
The concept of blameworthy action is central
both to the law (Hall, 1947) and to moral
judgment (Weiner, 1995). A blameworthy
action—a behavior that is “morally wrong or
socially opprobrious” (Alicke, 2000)—is a
prerequisite for moral condemnation and most
legal punishment, and so being found
blameworthy can have serious consequences, from
social exclusion to imprisonment. But by what
process do we determine that an action is worthy
of blame?
This question has received a great deal of
attention from philosophers (e.g., Austin, 1956;
Feinberg, 1968; Hart, 1968; Hart & Honore, 1959)
and psychologists (Darley & Zanna, 1982; Shultz
& Schleifer, 1983; Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman,
1981; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995), who have
developed normative and descriptive accounts of
how and why we blame. According to these
theories, the prototypical blameworthy action is
one where an agent causes harm to another, and
does so intentionally (Shaver, 1985). While blame
may also be ascribed to a lesser degree when either
factor is present alone—people sometimes
consider it blameworthy to cause harm even
accidentally (Alicke, 1992), or to perform an act
intended to harm another even if it fails
(Cushman, 2008)—these theories of responsibility
predict than an action will not be judged
blameworthy if it involves neither harmful intent
nor causal responsibility for a harmful outcome.
Yet there appear to be actions that are
considered blameworthy even if they neither cause
harm nor are performed with harmful intent.
Consider, for example, the behavior of Greg
Lippmann, a trader at Deutsche Bank who advised
investors to bet on mortgage defaults. Lippmann’s

strategy was to purchase financial instruments that
were linked to a pool of mortgages and that would
became far more valuable if those mortgages went
into default (i.e., if individual homeowners were
unable to make the payments on their homes). Of
course, Lippman’s bet did not (and could not)
cause the subprime mortgage crisis to occur.
Neither did Lippman intend for his bet to cause a
crisis. He merely sought to benefit from a tragic
event that he knew to be beyond his control.
From the perspective of the theories described
earlier there is no basis on which to judge actions
like Lippman’s blameworthy, and yet the
widespread public outcry against “short sellers”
who engage in similar behavior suggests that
people commonly do so. Why might this be the
case?
We propose that one reason such actions may
be deemed blameworthy is that individuals
consider a person’s desires as a target of moral
evaluation, particularly when there is a desire for
something harmful to occur. It is reasonable to
infer that when someone is in a position to gain
from an event, this produces an increased desire
for it to occur. For instance, people who buy a
lottery ticket likely desire that their winning
numbers be drawn, and gamblers at a racetrack
generally prefer that their horse win. Similarly, an
investor who stands to benefit if homeowners are
unable to pay their mortgages can be assumed to
desire widespread defaults. We suggest that
ordinary people consider it bad to desire
widespread mortgage defaults (or, more generally,
to desire that harm befall other people—what we
refer to as a “wicked desire”).
It is likely the case that people evaluate the
character of a person who possesses such wicked
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desires more negatively—this would be consistent
with a great deal of previous research
demonstrating that desires and preferences
influence judgments of an individual’s underlying
traits and dispositions (Funder, 2004). However,
we suggest that information about an agent’s
desires may play a role not just in the assessment
of an individual’s underlying moral character, but
in the moral evaluation of the actions themselves.
Specifically, we suggest that people may consider
it morally wrong for an agent to engage in any
action that engenders a wicked desire. For
instance, the reason Lippman may seem especially
blameworthy for performing an action with no
direct intention to harm nor that caused any harm
is because the act of hedging against mortgages
caused Lippman to root for the suffering of
homeowners—a desire that likely did not exist
before this action. An act may be deemed
blameworthy, then, if it causes a person to adopt
wicked desires.
The notion that desires play an important role
in moral evaluation is not a new one. We know,
for instance, that an action is judged more wrong
and blameworthy when the agent desires to cause
harm (Cushman, 2008; Pizarro, Uhlman, &
Salovey, 2003; Woolfolk, Doris & Darley, 2006).
However, “desire” in this sense is more centrally
tied to the notion of intent, and as such plays a
role that is perfectly consistent with standard
models of moral blame, on which intent to cause
harm is a critical feature of a blameworthy action.
What is unusual about the case of betting on
mortgage defaults is that the action (an
investment) is not performed with the desire to
cause harm, but merely with the hope of profiting
from a harm that is likely to occur (for entirely
independent reasons). Our prediction is that
people may find it morally objectionable to engage
in a behavior like betting on harm, not because the
act causes harm, but rather because the actor is
putting him or herself in a position to root for the
harm to occur.
In the experiments that follow, we test this
“wicked desires” account by examining people’s
moral judgments of harmless acts in which an
individual benefits from the misfortune of others.
In Study 1, we examine whether people do indeed
judge such acts as blameworthy. In Studies 2-4, we
test whether these judgments were explained by
the wicked desires account outlined above, while also
attempting to rule out alternative explanations.
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Study 1
In Study 1 we tested whether people would
judge harmless acts as blameworthy if these acts
allowed an individual to benefit from another’s
misfortune. To do so, we created a scenario that
conceptually paralleled the example described
above (betting against the U.S. mortgage market).
However, rather than using the emergence of a
financial crisis as the harm from which an agent
might benefit, we chose the occurrence of a
natural disaster (i.e., an earthquake in a developing
nation) because we assumed that, while
participants might believe that financial bets could
cause a financial crisis, they would not believe that
financial bets could cause a natural disaster.
Specifically, the scenario described a fund manager
at a financial firm who invested in “catastrophe
bonds,” which were described as gaining in value
either if an earthquake struck a certain developing
country (harm condition) or if an earthquake did
not strike the country (no harm condition). Thus,
receiving a payoff in the harm condition was an
instance of benefitting from a misfortune, whereas
a payoff in the no harm condition was not.
In addition to asking participants about their
judgments of blameworthiness of the fund
manager’s actions, we asked participants to make
judgments about his overall character. This
allowed us to test whether moral blame for
benefitting from misfortune is simply a result of
negative assessments of an individual’s moral
character.
Participants and Design
The study was administered online to 97
individuals recruited and paid via Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk web service (Paolacci, Chandler,
& Ipeirotis, 2010).1 All participants read a scenario
describing Mr. Green, “a money manager at a
large financial firm,” who had decided to invest
one of his funds in “catastrophe bonds.”
Participants randomly assigned to the harm
condition (n = 60) read that the bonds were
“worth little unless a severe earthquake strikes a
certain third world country in the next two years”
and that “[s]ure enough, an earthquake strikes,
causing great devastation, and the bonds become
very valuable.” Participants assigned to the no harm
condition (n = 37), read that the bonds gained
value “as long as a certain third world country is
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NOT struck by an earthquake in the next two
years,” and that “[s]ure enough, there is no
earthquake and the bonds become very valuable.”
Participants then completed two items
assessing the blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s
actions: “Do you think what Mr. Green did was
morally wrong” from 1 (Not wrong at all) to 9 (Very
wrong); and “To what extent should Mr. Green be
morally blamed for his action” from 1 (Not blamed
at all) to 9 (Blamed very much). Participants also
completed two questions about Mr. Green’s
global character: “Do you think that Mr. Green is
mainly a good person or a bad person?” from 1
(Mainly a bad person) to 9 (Mainly a good person); and
“Do you think that Mr. Green has good moral
standards?” from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Completely).
Finally, in order to assess whether the effect of the
manipulation was moderated by how much
experience participants’ had with financial
investments, we asked participants to indicate
their investment experience on a scale from 1
(Very little) to 9 (A great deal). In order to minimize
the length of the study, we did not collect
demographic information.
Results and Discussion
As the item assessing investment experience
did not moderate the results we will not discuss it
further.
Because responses to the two action
judgments (r = .86, p < .0001) and the two
character judgments (r = .70, p < .0001) were
highly correlated, we combined the first two items
into a blameworthiness composite and the latter two
items into a character composite. The two
composites correlated significantly, r = -.51, p <
.0001.
As predicted, participants viewed the money
manager’s actions as more blameworthy when he
benefited from harm, as indicated by the
blameworthiness composite scores across
conditions: Mharm = 4.33, Mno harm = 2.35, t(95) =
4.15, p < .0001, d = .85. Participants also saw the
money manager’s character as worse when he
benefited from harm, as indicated by scores on the
character composite across conditions: Mharm =
4.84, Mno harm = 5.99, t(95) = 3.55, p = .0006, d =
.73. However, an ANCOVA on blameworthiness
controlling for character judgments still showed a
significant effect of condition, F(1, 94) = 7.31, p =
.008.
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As predicted, participants saw an action that
benefited from harm as more blameworthy than
an otherwise identical action that did not, even
when controlling for negative assessments of the
actor’s character. These results provide the first
evidence that people find benefiting from harm to
be morally blameworthy, and that this is not
simply a result of a greater willingness to blame
individuals who are seen as having bad character.
This was despite the fact that participants were
unlikely to assume that the harm (an earthquake)
could have been caused by the action (purchasing
a bond).
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that individuals who
benefit from harms that they neither cause nor
intend to cause are nonetheless judged to be
morally blameworthy. Study 2 tests plausible
alternative explanations for this pattern of results.
For instance, it may be that the negative affect
resulting from reading about a harmful event (e.g.,
a natural disaster) might give rise to a greater
overall willingness to ascribe blame. Just as people
are more likely ascribe blame when they are
feeling angry (even if the anger is elicited by an
unrelated task; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock,
1999), participants in our study may have been
more likely to make judgments of blame when
reading about a misfortune, even when the
individual being judged bore no causal
responsibility for having brought about the event
(we will call this the scapegoating account). A
number of studies demonstrate “belief in a just
world,” according to which individuals are blamed
for bad things that happen to them (Lerner, 1980).
By analogy, participants in our study may have
blamed bad individuals for bad things that
happened to others. In the present experiment we
attempted to rule out this alternative explanation.
Participants were asked to make judgments
about a stock investor who took either a short
position (i.e., betting that a stock would go
decrease in value) or a long position (i.e., betting
that a stock would increase in value). In addition,
we manipulated whether the stock was described
as actually increasing or decreasing in value. We
hypothesized that as in Study 1 individuals would
make more negative evaluations of the investor
who stood to profit from the misfortune of others
(by “shorting” the stock). Moreover, we included
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information about whether the stock increased or
decreased in order to test two competing
explanations for this effect. Specifically, we
reasoned that if people view such actions as
morally objectionable because they signal an
underlying desire for harm to come about (the
wicked desires account), participants should find
the action objectionable regardless of the stock’s
actual performance. On the other hand, if reading
about a negative outcome simply makes people
more willing to blame (the scapegoating account),
individuals would not find the short-selling
objectionable if the negative outcome did not
obtain.
Participants and Design
The study was administered online to 200 U.S.
adults (114 female; ages 19-86; Mage = 35, SDage =
12.27) who were recruited and paid via
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk web service
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). All
participants read about Mr. Brown, a wealthy
investor who took a long or a short position on the
stock of Widgetron, Inc. One group (the up
condition) read that Widgetron’s stock increased
from $15 to $25; the other (the down condition)
read that Widgetron’s stock decreased from $15 to
$5. Finally, participants were randomly assigned to
read that Mr. Brown either made or lost “several
million dollars” on his investment (whether Mr.
Brown was described as making or losing money
depended, of course, on whether he had correctly
anticipated whether the stock’s price would rise or
fall). Participants then completed the same items
used in Study 1: two items assessing the
blameworthiness of Mr. Brown’s actions, two
items assessing his overall character, and one item
assessing participants’ investment experience (as in
Study 1, this item did not moderate any results, so
we do not discuss it further).
Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, we constructed a blameworthiness
composite and a character composite by combining
responses to the two action judgments (r = .87, p
< .0001) and the two character judgments (r = .60,
p < .0001). The two composites correlated
significantly, r = -.30, p < .0001.
Replicating the effect found in Study 1, a 2
(investment: short vs. long), x 2 (outcome: stock up
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vs. stock down) ANOVA on blameworthiness
judgments showed that taking a short position was
seen as more blameworthy than taking a long
position, Mshort =3.68, Mlong = 2.55, F(1, 196) =
12.79, p < .001. Supporting the wicked desires
account, the actual outcome (whether the stock
actually increased or decreased in price) had no
effect on blameworthiness judgments (nor did the
interaction between outcome and investment;
both ps > .40). A planned contrast comparing the
short/stock up with the short/stock down condition
showed no significant difference, F(1, 196) = .19,
ns.
A parallel analysis examining character
composite scores again showed a significant effect
of investment (and replicated the results of Study
1): participants saw the investor’s character as
worse when he took a short position, Mshort =5.35,
Mlong = 5.75, F(1, 196) = 4.14, p = .04. However,
as in Study 1, an ANCOVA on blameworthiness
judgments controlling for character judgments still
showed a significant effect of taking a short vs. a
long position, F(1, 195) = 9.59, p = .002.
As in Study 1, participants judged actions that
produced a desire for harm to be more
blameworthy than otherwise identical actions that
did not, and correspondingly judged individuals
more harshly for the first type of action than the
second. Also as in Study 1, blame for these actions
did not depend on negative character judgments:
An investor was blamed more for taking a short
than a long position even controlling for
assessments of his character.
Contrary to the scapegoating account (which
would predict an indiscriminate increase in blame
when a negative outcome obtains), these results
demonstrate that the presence of actual harm (or
benefit) is not necessary for this effect to occur—
participants judged even the attempt to benefit
from harm as blameworthy. Rather, people seem
to be willing to condemn mere attempts to benefit
from harm, even when these attempts are
unsuccessful.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that people find
benefiting from harm—or even the attempt to do
so—to be morally blameworthy. While Study 2
allowed us to rule out the scapegoating account to
explain this effect, we have not yet shown direct
evidence for the wicked desires account—that
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people see benefiting from harm to be
blameworthy because it reflects a desire for a bad
outcome to occur. We conducted Study 3 in order
to provide more direct evidence for the wicked
desires account, as well as to rule out another
alternative explanation: that those who benefit
from harm are seen as “magically” having caused a
harmful outcome. While at first glance such a
belief seems implausible among educated
undergraduates, there is no lack of evidence that
even well-educated undergraduates commonly
harbor a variety of magical beliefs (Risen &
Gilovich, 2008; Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). Most
relevant to the current research, Pronin and
colleagues (2006) have shown that people
sometimes believe that they have caused a desired
outcome even when there is no way that they
could have done so. For example, participants
who performed a symbolic act of harm (a
“voodoo hex”) directed at a disliked confederate
(whom the participants presumably wanted to
harm) felt more responsible for the confederate’s
subsequent symptoms of physical illness than did
those who targeted a neutral confederate. It may
be that this is why participants in our studies judge
these acts to be blameworthy—because they
believe that desiring harm may in some way cause
an increased chance that the harm will actually
occur, and therefore those who desire harm bear
causal responsibility for the outcome (we call this
the magical thinking account).
In the current study we used the same
scenario as in Study 1 (the catastrophe bond).
Some participants read that the firm’s profits were
contingent on a good or bad outcome, whereas
others read that the firm’s profits were noncontingent on the outcome (i.e., the firm made a
profit regardless of the outcome). We reasoned
that in the contingent cases, participants would infer
that the fund manager’s behavior would produce a
desire for harm because his profit would be
contingent on harm. In the non-contingent cases,
however, participants would be less likely to infer
that the fund manager’s behavior would produce a
desire for harm because his profit would be
identical whether or not the harm occurred. If the
wicked desires account holds, individuals in this
condition should be seen as less blameworthy for
the same action (purchasing bonds that pay off in
case of disaster).
As an additional method for distinguishing
between these explanations we asked participants
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directly about their perceptions of the fund
manager’s desires. In addition, in order to test the
possibility that participants held the belief that
these desires might have a causal influence over
the outcome, we also asked participants to report
how much control the fund manager had over the
outcome. Because participants’ investment
experience failed to moderate the results of the
previous experiments, we did not assess it here. In
order to minimize the length of the study, we also
did not collect demographic information.
Participants and Design
The study was administered online to 116 U.S.
adults, who were recruited and paid via
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk web service
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
four conditions in a 2 (investment: harm vs. no
harm) x 2 (profit: contingent profit vs. non-contingent
profit) between-subjects design. All participants
read about Mr. Green, “a money manager at a
large financial firm,” who decides to invest one of
his funds heavily in “catastrophe bonds.” In the
harm condition, the bonds were described as
“worth little unless a severe hurricane strikes a
certain third world country in the next two years,
in which case they gain value.” In the no harm
condition, they were described as “worth little
unless a certain third world country is NOT struck
by a hurricane in the next two years, in which case
they gain value.”
In the contingent profit conditions, no additional
information about Mr. Green’s investment was
provided. However, in the non-contingent profit
conditions, Mr. Green was described as
discovering that “many of his firm's investments
in a certain third world country would lose a great
deal of value [if a severe hurricane were to
strike/unless a severe hurricane were to strike] in
the next two years.” Mr. Green purchases the
catastrophe bonds in order to protect the firm
against this possibility, so that “whether Mr.
Green’s firm makes money is not affected by
whether a hurricane strikes.” No outcome
information (i.e., whether a hurricane struck) was
given (see Appendix A for the full text of the
scenarios).
Next, we assessed participants’ perceptions of
Mr. Green’s desires and control over the outcome
by asking them to indicate, on 9-point scales
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anchored by Totally disagree and Totally agree, how
much they agreed that “Mr. Green was hoping a
hurricane would strike the third world country;”
“Mr. Green wanted a hurricane to strike the third
world country;” “Somehow, Mr. Green affected
what would happen to the third world country;”
and “Mr. Green’s behavior changed the likelihood
that a hurricane would strike the third world
country.” These questions were presented in
random order. Participants then completed the
same four evaluation items used in the previous
studies: two assessing the blameworthiness of Mr.
Green’s actions and two assessing evaluations of
his overall character.
Results and Discussion
We first examined whether our manipulation
of motive had the expected effect on perceptions
desires. Responses to the two “desire” items
(“hoping a hurricane would strike” and “wanted a
hurricane to strike”) were highly correlated, r(116)
= .93, p < .0001, and were therefore combined
into a single composite. A 2 (investment: harm vs.
no harm) x 2 (profit: contingent vs. non-contingent)
ANOVA on this composite showed a significant
interaction, F(1, 112) = 84.65, p < .001. Follow-up
tests showed that the profit manipulation had the
expected effect on perceptions of desires: In the
contingent profit condition, Mr. Green was seen as
much more desirous of a hurricane when he had
bought bonds that paid off in the event of a
hurricane strike: Mharm = 7.35, Mno harm = 1.20,
t(112) = 14.15, p < .0001. In the non-contingent profit
condition, Mr. Green’s perceived desires were not
judged differentially according to the kind of
bonds he had bought, Mharm = 2.72, Mno harm = 2.92,
t(112) = .39, ns (see Figure 1).
We next examined participants’ evaluations of
the blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s actions. As in
previous experiments, the two blameworthiness
items were highly correlated (r = .87, p < .0001)
and were combined into a composite.
A 2 (investment: harm vs. no harm) x 2 (profit:
contingent vs. non-contingent) ANOVA on
blameworthiness judgments showed a significant
interaction, F(1, 112) = 6.94, p = .01 (see Figure
1). Follow-up tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that
the interaction was due to greater condemnation
of Mr. Green’s behavior in the harm/contingent profit
condition (M = 4.78), which was significantly
higher than in the other three conditions (all ps <
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.05). None of the other three conditions differed
significantly from each other, Mharm/non-contingent profit =
2.26, Mno harm/non-contingent profit = 2.45, Mno harm/contingent profit =
2.76. Repeating these tests with a composite of the
two character items (r = .84, p < .001) as a
covariate showed that blameworthiness judgments
remained significantly higher in the harm/contingent
profit condition than in each of the other three
conditions (all ps < .05), which did not differ
significantly from each other.
We next tested our causal model by examining
whether perceptions of Mr. Green’s desires
mediated the interactive effects of investment and
profit on blame. We first tested whether the
desires composite predicted blame for his actions.
It did, ! = .45, t(114) = 5.39, p < .0001. Next, we
regressed action evaluations on the desires
composite, investment condition, profit condition,
and the investment x profit interaction. Perceived
desires continued to predict action evaluations, !
= .36, t(111) = 2.55, p = .01, but the investment x
profit interaction was no longer a significant
predictor, ! = .04, t(111) = .36, ns. A Sobel test
confirmed that this drop was significant,
indicating full mediation, Z = 2.46, p = .014.
Finally, we examined whether perceptions of
Mr. Green’s control over the outcome (i.e.,
magical thinking) mediated evaluations of his
actions. The two control items (“Somehow, Mr.
Green affected what would happen to the third
world country” and “Mr. Green’s behavior
changed the likelihood that a hurricane would
strike the third world country”) were only
moderately correlated, r = .30, p = .001. Separately
examining correlations between each of the
control items and the blameworthiness evaluations
showed that judgments of blame were marginally
correlated with the “changed likelihood” item,
r(116) = .16, p = .09, and significantly correlated
with the “affected what would happen” item,
r(116) = .20, p = .03 (no other correlations were
significant, all rs < .12). However, neither control
item was affected by investment, profit, or their
interaction, all ts < 1.2, all ps > .25. Thus, it does
not appear that our participants regarded
benefiting from harm as blameworthy because of
a “magical” belief that desires can cause harmful
outcomes.
The results of the current study buttress the
results of Studies 1 and 2: Again, participants
viewed attempts to benefit from harm as
blameworthy, even when controlling for negative
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evaluations of the actor’s character. However, the
current results go beyond the previous findings by
showing that these evaluations are mediated by
perceived desire for a harmful outcome: When
there was no reason to believe that Mr. Green
wanted the harmful outcome to occur (because he
would profit both if it took place and if it did not)
his attempt to benefit from harm was not seen as
blameworthy. Moreover, perceptions of Mr.
Green’s desires for a harmful outcome mediated
condemnation of his actions, lending further
support for the “wicked desires” account.
Additionally, the results of the current study
are inconsistent with the several proposed
alternative explanations of the phenomenon.
Because no outcome information was provided,
the scapegoating account would predict no
condemnation of mere attempts to benefit from
harm. In addition, the two items included to assess
whether participants thought that Mr. Green
possessed control over a desired outcome did not
differ across our experimental conditions, a result
that is inconsistent with the magical thinking
explanation.
Study 4
Studies 1-3 demonstrate that individuals are
judged to be morally blameworthy when they
position themselves to benefit from harm, which
is mediated by perceptions of desires for a
harmful outcome. In all three studies participants
condemned attempts to benefit from harm even
when controlling for their judgments of the actor’s
character, suggesting that negative evaluations of
these acts do not simply reflect an indiscriminate
willingness to condemn the actions of disliked
individuals. In Study 4 we seek to provide further
evidence of the independence of blame and
character judgments. In particular we test whether
people indiscriminately assign blame to any bet
placed by an investor with a bad character, or
instead selectively assign blame for the specific
bets that lead individuals to adopt wicked desires.
In order to do so, we modified the
catastrophe bond scenario used in previous
studies. As before, half of participants read about
a fund manager’s decision to buy bonds that that
become more valuable following a natural disaster
(the bad manager), while half of participants read
about the a fund manager’s decision to buy bonds
that become less valuable following a natural
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disaster (the good manager). (We predicted that
the first manager would be judged bad and the
second manager judged good based on the
consistent results of Studies 1-3.) However, each
scenario went on to describe those same managers
later selling their bonds in order to have more cash
on hand. Thus, each actor performs two actions:
An initial investment in a catastrophe bond, and a
subsequent divestment from that same bond.
If people are simply inclined to condemn any
actions of immoral individuals, they should rate
both actions (buying and selling the bonds) to be
more morally bad when performed by the morally
bad manager compared to when those actions are
performed by the morally good manager. The
initial investments would signal the moral
character of the managers, and then information
about moral character would subsequently
influence the judgment of both the buying acts
and the selling acts equally.
Our wicked desires account, however,
predicts that buying bonds that appreciate when
harm occurs will be judged a morally bad action,
but subsequently selling those bonds will not be
judged a morally bad action (even though the
actor remains the same and character is therefore
held constant). In other words, being a morally
bad manager will not be sufficient to taint any
transaction involving a catastrophe bond. Only
those specific actions that adopt a wicked desire
will be judged morally wrong.
Participants and Design
The study was administered online to 145 U.S.
adults (87 female; ages 18-74; Mage = 35, SDage =
12.36), who were recruited and paid via
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk web service
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
four conditions in a 2 (investment: harm vs. no
harm) x 2 (action: buy vs. sell) between-subjects
design. All participants read about Mr. Green, “a
money manager at a large financial firm,” who
decides to invest one of his funds heavily in
“catastrophe bonds.” In the harm condition, the
bonds were described as “worth little unless a
severe earthquake strikes a certain third world
country in the next two years, in which case they
gain value.” In the no harm condition, they were
described as “worth little unless a certain third
world country is NOT struck by an earthquake in

In press: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

the next two years, in which case they gain value.”
All participants then read that “the next day, Mr.
Green’s firm unexpectedly has to make a large
cash payment to a major shareholder,” and that
“in order to come up with this cash, Mr. Green
sells back the cat bonds he bought the day
before.” All participants then completed the two
character evaluation items used in the previous
studies.
Participants in the buy condition then saw a
new page with the instruction to “consider Mr.
Green’s decision to BUY the catastrophe bonds”
and were asked to evaluate this decision using the
same action evaluation items used in the previous
studies (“Buying the catastrophe bonds was
morally wrong”; “Mr. Green should be morally
blamed for buying the catastrophe bonds”).
Participants in the sell condition made the same
judgments, but regarding Mr. Green’s decision to
sell the bonds.
Results and Discussion
We first tested whether participants evaluated
Mr. Green’s character more negatively in the harm
condition. The two character items were highly
correlated, r(145) = .87, p < .001, and were
therefore combined into a composite. As
expected, in the harm condition evaluations of Mr.
Green’s character were more negative (M = 4.92)
than in the no harm condition (M = 6.39), t(143) =
5.05, p < .0001. Thus, our manipulation
successfully affected evaluations of Mr. Green’s
character.
We next examined evaluations of Mr. Green’s
actions. The two action evaluation items were
highly correlated, r(145) = .79, p < .001, and were
combined into a composite measure of blame.
Inspecting these composite scores revealed
substantial positive skew (skewness = .755;
kurtosis = -1.03) so non-parametric tests were
used. A Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric ANOVA
showed that blame differed significantly by
condition, "2(3) = 8.36, p = .04. Follow up tests
(Mann-Whitney U) showed that in the harm/buy
condition—in which Mr. Green bought bonds
that paid off in case of disaster—blame was
significantly higher (M=4.58, SD=2.57) than in
each of the other three conditions (Mharm/sell = 3.35,
SD=2.32; Mno harm/buy = 3.26, SD=2.37; Mno harm/sell =
3.08, SD=1.85), all ps < .03. None of the other
conditions differed significantly from each other,
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all ps > .60 (see Figure 2).2 Thus, these results
support the wicked desires account, which
predicts that only actions that position one to
benefit from harm should elicit increased blame,
over the indiscriminate condemnation account, which
predicts that an agent who has demonstrated bad
character by buying bonds that appreciate after
disasters should also be blamed for subsequently
selling them.
The results of this study buttress the results of
Studies 1-3: In those studies, statistically
controlling for character judgments did not
eliminate blame for attempts to benefit from
harm. In the current study, we experimentally
demonstrate a dissociation between judgments of
blame and evaluations of character. Character
evaluations were more negative when actors had
attempted to benefit from harm, but only actions
that positioned them to do so were seen as
blameworthy. These results show that attempts to
benefit from harm are seen as morally
blameworthy independent of people’s negative
evaluations of the beneficiary’s moral character.
General Discussion
Across four experiments we provided
evidence that people judge an individual as
blameworthy if he positions himself to benefit
from harm—even if he has no control over
whether the harm occurs. Moreover, we found
that even mere attempts to benefit from harm
were seen as blameworthy, both when they were
unsuccessful (Study 2) and when no outcome
information was available (Study 3). As predicted
by our wicked desires account, moral disapproval
of these acts was mediated by the assumptions
about the individual’s underlying desires:
Individuals benefitting from harm were seen as
possessing a desire for the harm to occur, which
in turn led to moral condemnation. However, this
effect was eliminated if the benefit from harm
functioned to offset another corresponding cost,
such that the individual had no overall reason to
prefer harm to non-harm (Study 3). By changing
participants’ perceptions of the desires likely to
result from the individual’s behavior, this
information eliminated blame for benefiting from
harm. Blame for benefiting from harm was not
merely the result of negative evaluations of the
beneficiary’s character: In Studies 1-3, statistically
controlling for negative evaluations of the
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individual’s character did not eliminate blame for
benefiting from harm. In Study 4, we found that
character evaluations of individuals who had
attempted to benefit from harm were more
negative, but only actions that actually positioned
them to do so were seen as blameworthy.
These
results
are
problematic
for
psychological theories of blame and responsibility
which emphasize the presence of causal responsibility
for harm and the intention to cause harm as
necessary for the attribution of moral blame (e.g.
Fincham & Shultz, 1981; Piaget, 1932; Shaver,
1985; Weiner, 1995). We have suggested an
alternative account—that participants assign moral
blame even in the absence of causality and
intentionality when the act in question requires the
actor to adopt a wicked desire. In the current
experiments, individuals who benefitted from
harm chose to “root” for a bad outcome, and
these desires were sufficient to trigger judgments
of blame and bad character even when it was
obvious that the individual had no causal control
over the harm that occurred. While the current
studies do not contradict the weight of evidence
demonstrating that causal responsibility for harm
and intent to harm are sufficient to trigger moral
condemnation, it provides evidence that they are
not always necessary—adopting wicked desires
would also appear sufficient.
These findings appear more consistent with
the theoretical approach of Tetlock and
colleagues, who have proposed a sacred value
protection model of moral judgment (SVPM;
Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000), although even
this approach cannot fully account for the current
findings. The SVPM posits that people deem
some values (e.g., preserving human life) to be
“sacred,” and react with moral outrage when these
values are “contaminated” by non-sacred concerns
such as financial profit. For instance, in the
scenarios we describe, it may be that merely
contemplating a harmful outcome (especially in
the context of financial decisions) might give rise
to judgments of blameworthiness. Yet the SVPM
cannot explain several core findings of our studies.
For one, the contemplation of a harmful event
alone does not appear sufficient to explain the
difference in judgments for an actor who placed a
bet for or against that event—both parties would
be equally “guilty” of considering the event. More
importantly, the SVPM would not predict that
manipulating the perception of an actor’s desires
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would affect whether speculating on disasters was
deemed blameworthy. Along the same lines, it
would not predict differing moral evaluations of
buying vs. selling financial instruments that allow
one to profit from a natural disaster. All of these
behaviors can, in an important way, be seen as
contaminating the “sacred” domain of human life
with financial speculation. Finally, the SVPM
would have difficulty explaining negative moral
evaluations when the sacred domain does not
enter the picture (such as the study in which an
agent is judged to be blameworthy for “shorting”
a stock to make a profit), since monetary profit or
loss is not held as a sacred moral value. Thus,
while our data do not contradict the SVPM, it
cannot explain the core pattern of results that
motivates the wicked desires account.
Implications for a character-based account of moral
judgment
Having demonstrated that moral assessments
do track wicked desires, we now turn to a more
fundamental question: Why? Our results are
consistent with recent suggestions that moral
evaluations of acts often depend on what these
acts imply about the actor’s character (Pizarro &
Tanenbaum, in press; Pizarro & Helzer, in press).
Put simply, one way that people appear answer the
question “was that action wrong?” is to ask the
question, “could only a bad person have done it?”
Consider several examples. One recent study
shows that people tend to judge a difficult moral
decision (e.g., whether to deny an expensive organ
transplant to a needy patient) more harshly if it is
made quickly and without qualms, as compared to
slowly and with much deliberation (Critcher,
Inbar, & Pizarro, 2011). People seem to reason
that only a bad person could make such a decision
without hesitation or conflict, and this leads them
to judge the action blameworthy. Another recent
study showed that people consider it worse to fire
a small fraction of employees of one race than to
fire a full complement of employees comprising
several races—even though the latter action harms
every person the former action does and many
more to boot (Uhlmann, Tannenbaum, &
Diermier, in press). People seem to reason that
only a bad person would single out and fire
employees of one race, and this leads them to
judge the (quantitatively) less harmful action to be
more blameworthy. Similarly, in the present study
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people may reason, “only a bad person could be
comfortable adopting the desire harm to others,”
and therefore conclude that betting on harm is
wrong.
This model may generalize to a host of other
behaviors. For example, imagine someone who
sticks pins into a voodoo doll representing a rival
(without any belief, of course, that this will
actually work), or someone who mutilates pictures
of his or her ex-boyfriend or ex-girlfriend. We
suspect that people would conclude that only a
bad person could perform these actions because
of the desires that they require the agent to adopt.
Thus, the actions themselves might be judged
morally wrong and blameworthy despite the full
knowledge that they could not possibly cause
harm. Similarly, people’s willingness to condemn
symbolic offenses—such as cleaning one’s toilet
with the national flag (Haidt, Koller, & Dias,
1993)—may be due at least in part to the negative
character inferences that these actions are taken to
support.
While the above-mentioned examples (like
many hypothetical stimuli employed in the study
of moral judgment) are both uncommon and
somewhat artificial, financial instruments allowing
one to benefit from harm are common and widely
accepted among financial professionals. For
example, “life settlement-backed securities”—or,
more bluntly, “death bonds”—allow people
holding life insurance to sell their policies to
investors, who pay the premiums and then collect
the payout when the policy-holder dies. Major
investment banks have recently discovered that
these policies can be pooled, converted into
bonds, and sold to institutional investors as
pensions and mutual funds (Goldstein, 2007). We
have suggested one reason that people find these
kinds of financial instruments objectionable, and
we believe that their designers and purchasers may
do well to keep the widespread aversion to
benefiting from harm in mind.
Although further research is required before
we fully understand how inferences about
character shape the moral evaluation of actions,
the first step may be to adjust descriptive theories
of moral judgment to account for the growing
evidence that people judge acts not only the basis
of local intentions and outcomes, but also on the
basis of how those actions shape an individuals’
desires, and what they imply about the actor’s
moral character. We believe that this approach not
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only explains results that might otherwise be
regarded as performance errors or anomalies, but
also provides a fuller and more accurate picture of
people’s real-world moral judgments.
Footnotes
1. In order to minimize length, we did not collect
demographic information in Studies 1 and 3,
although we did use Amazon.com’s respondent
selection tools to restrict our studies to U.S.
adults. When we did collect demographics in
Study 2, we found that gender and age (57%
female; M age = 35) were remarkably close to
those reported by Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis
(2010) for a sample of 1,000 Mechanical Turk
workers collected in early 2010 (64.85% female, M
age = 36). As Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis point
out, although this population is younger and
(obviously) more female than the U.S. population
as a whole, it is nevertheless a good deal more
representative of the population than are the
undergraduate subject pools often used in
psychological research.
2. Using a conventional (i.e., parametric) 2 x 2
ANOVA, the omnibus interaction test was not
significant, F(1, 141)=1.85, p=.18. This was true
even after the data were log-transformed, F(1,
141)=2.63, p=.11. However, as Bobko (1986)
shows, omnibus interaction tests in ANOVA lack
power when—as in the current study—an ordinal
interaction is expected (that is, when one cell is
expected to differ from all others). Following
Bobko’s two-step procedure for testing ordinal
interactions showed that blame in the harm/sell, no
harm/sell, and no harm/buy conditions did not
differ, F(2, 105)=.14, p=.87; and that blame was
higher in the harm/buy condition than in the other
three conditions, planned contrast F(1, 141) =
9.42, p = .003.
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Figure 1. Blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s behavior (left panel) and perceived desires (right panel) by investment and profit condition. Higher values
reflect greater blame and greater perceived desires for the harmful event. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2. Blameworthiness of Mr. Green’s behavior (left panel) and evaluations of his character (right panel) by investment and action condition. Higher
bars in the left panel reflect greater blame; higher bars in the right panel reflect more positive character judgments. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals.
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Appendix A
Harm/contingent profit:
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He decides to invest one of his funds heavily in
catastrophe bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds are worth little unless a severe hurricane strikes a certain
third world country in the next two years, in which case they gain value. So Mr. Green’s firm makes money
only if a hurricane strikes the third world country.
No harm/contingent profit:
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He decides to invest one of his funds heavily in
catastrophe bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds gain value as long as a certain third world country is NOT
struck by a hurricane in the next two years. So Mr. Green’s firm makes money only if a hurricane does NOT
strike the third world country.
Harm/non-contingent profit:
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He discovers that many of his firm's investments in a
certain third world country would lose a great deal of value if a severe hurricane were to strike in the next two
years. In order to protect the firm against this, he decides to invest one of his funds heavily in catastrophe
bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds are worth little unless a severe hurricane strikes the third world country
in the next two years, in which case they gain value. So whether Mr. Green’s firm makes money is not
affected by whether a hurricane strikes the third world country.
No harm/non-contingent profit
Mr. Green is a money manager at a large financial firm. He discovers that many of his firm's investments in a
certain third world country will lose a great deal of value UNLESS a severe hurricane were to strike in the
next two years. In order to protect the firm against this, he decides to invest one of his funds heavily in
catastrophe bonds, or “cat bonds.” These bonds gain value as long as the third world country is NOT struck
by a hurricane in the next two years. So whether Mr. Green’s firm makes money is not affected by whether a
hurricane strikes the third world country.
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